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FINDING THE POINT OF NOVELTY IN SOFTWARE
PATENTS
Bernard Chao†

ABSTRACT
The issue of patentable subject matter eligibility is in considerable flux. In 2012, the
Supreme Court set forth a confusing new framework for determining patent eligibility. The
decision in Mayo v. Prometheus cast serious doubt on the continued viability of many software
patents. Indeed, a split quickly emerged in the Federal Circuit. As a result, it was unclear
whether adding computer limitations to an otherwise unpatentable concept somehow
renders the concept patent-eligible. In an attempt to settle this question, the Federal Circuit
granted a petition to rehear the issue en banc. But in CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., the judges
could not find common ground and the decision contained seven separate opinions
reflecting at least three distinct approaches. Thus, there remains a pressing need to find a
common analytical framework for deciding software patent eligibility questions.
There is a way out of the current morass without departing from precedent. In Mayo,
the Supreme Court implicitly revived long rejected point-of-novelty thinking. In an earlier
essay, I expanded on that approach and offered a general framework for making patentable
subject matter eligibility determinations. This Article applies this approach to software
patents. Specifically, it explains that the key to determining whether a software patent covers
eligible subject matter is assessing the strength of the connection between the patent’s point
of novelty and physical devices found in the other claim limitations. This test serves to rein
in harmful business method software patents without affecting more deserving industrial
patents. Thus, the test is justified from both doctrinal and policy perspectives.
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† Assistant Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I would like to
thank Brian Love, Kevin Emerson Collins, Viva Moffat, Dmitry Karshtedt, Harry Surden,
Justin Pidot, John Soma, and Ian Farrell for their comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
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INTRODUCTION

Last year, in Mayo v. Prometheus, the Supreme Court made another attempt
to define the scope of patentable subject matter.1 A unanimous Supreme
Court held that the personalized medicine dosing process invented by
Prometheus Laboratories was not eligible for patent protection because the
process was effectively an unpatentable law of nature.2 Although the decision
did not directly address software patents, it set forth a confusing framework
for subject-matter patent eligibility that will apply to software patents.
In the wake of Mayo, the Federal Circuit has already issued two
conflicting decisions on the eligibility of software patents.3 Although both
cases involved patents on business concepts implemented through software,
the two decisions applied different approaches to patentability and arrived at
different outcomes. On July 9, 2012, in CLS Bank International v. Alice Corp., a
1. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). Just
two years earlier, the Supreme Court decided Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010), a
decision that ostensibly set out the rules for determining subject matter eligibility under
§ 101. See also Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293 (“[L]aws of nature . . . are not patentable.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citing Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3233–34). Section 101 provides that
“[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
2. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294.
3. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. (CLS Bank I), 685 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2012), reh’g en
banc granted, opinion vacated, 484 F. App’x 559 (Fed. Cir. 2012), aff’d en banc, 717 F.3d 1269
(Fed. Cir. 2013); Bancorp Servs. v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 687 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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panel of the Federal Circuit found that patents covering a trading system
platform for exchanging obligations contained patent-eligible subject matter.4
Less than a month later, in Bancorp Services v. Sun Life Assurance Co., a different
panel found that patents covering a system for administering and tracking life
insurance values were invalid because they covered an unpatentable abstract
idea.5 Unsurprisingly, the Federal Circuit decided to resolve this split and
granted a petition for an en banc rehearing in CLS Bank.6 Specifically, the
court asked the parties: “[W]hat test should the court adopt to determine
whether a computer-implemented invention is a patent ineligible ‘abstract
idea’ . . . ?”7
This Article originally set out to respond to this question. However,
shortly before it went to press, the Federal Circuit issued its en banc decision
in CLS Bank.8 Unfortunately, the seven separate opinions found in this split
decision only added to the confusion.9 Part V of this Article is a “postscript”
describing these different views. Although a majority of seven judges found
that the method and computer-readable claims at issue were not patenteligible, the court split evenly (5-5) on the eligibility of the system claims.10
Moreover, no majority could agree on a common analytical approach.
Instead, the 135-page decision reflected at least three distinct analytical
approaches.11 The judges themselves characterized the decision as
“irreconcilably fractured”12 and “devoid of consensus.”13 Thus, there
continues to be a pressing need to find a “consistent, cohesive, and
accessible” framework for determining when software patents cover patenteligible subject matter under § 101 of the Patent Act.14

4. CLS Bank I, 685 F.3d at 1356 (Linn, Prost & O’Malley, JJ.).
5. Bancorp, 687 F.3d at 1281 (Lourie, Prost & Wallach, JJ.).
6. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. (CLS Bank II), 484 F. App’x 559 (order granting
hearing en banc).
7. Id.
8. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. (CLS Bank III), 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en
banc).
9. See id.
10. The result was that the district court’s holding that none of the claims were drawn
to eligible subject matter was affirmed. CLS Bank III, 717 F.3d at 1273 (per curiam).
11. See discussion infra Part V (discussing the opinions of Judge Lourie (concurring),
Chief Judge Rader (concurring in part and dissenting in part), and Judge Newman
(concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
12. CLS Bank III, 717 F.3d at 1314. (Moore, J., dissenting in part).
13. Id. at 1321 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
14. Id. at 1277 (Lourie, J., concurring) (discussing the need for a workable approach in
§ 101 jurisprudence).
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Building on earlier work,15 this Article attempts to provide that
framework. The suggested approach does not attempt to make any
fundamental changes to § 101 in hopes of finding the “best” solution for
patent law. Rather, the proposed approach seeks to provide a practical and
coherent framework that sensibly brings the doctrine of subject-matter
patentability as applied to software patents in line with the Mayo decision.
Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not
patentable.16 But identifying when a patent covers one of these unpatentable
concepts (as opposed to an application of such a concept—which is
patentable17) has proven to be quite difficult. The Federal Circuit panel in
Mayo dissected the claims of Prometheus’ personalized medicine patent and
held that they did not add “enough” to an unpatentable law of nature to gain
patent protection.18 Unfortunately, the court never explained what, exactly,
would be “enough.” Since many patents involve unpatentable concepts to
some extent, Mayo exposed a host of seemingly uncontroversial patents,
including many software patents, to attacks on patent-eligibility grounds.19
The Supreme Court used a kind of point-of-novelty analysis in Mayo by
focusing on what limitations were added to the law of nature at the heart of
Prometheus’ patents.20 This hearkens back to the reasoning used years ago in
Parker v. Flook.21 In Flook, the Supreme Court treated the unpatentable
formula that lay at the heart of Flook’s patent as if it were in the prior art.22
But once that determination had been made, the application did not contain
any patentable invention and the Court concluded that it did not cover
patent-eligible subject matter.23 However, the Court later rejected this
approach in Diamond v. Diehr when it said that “[i]n determining the eligibility

15. Bernard Chao, Moderating Mayo, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 423 (2012).
16. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
17. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293–94
(2012).
18. Id. at 1297 (emphasis omitted).
19. Michael J. Malecek & Kenneth M. Maikish, The Prometheus Effect on Software
Patents, 24 NO. 6 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 3, 3, 7 (2012) (arguing that the reasoning in
Mayo suggests that software patents containing a mental step are not directed towards
patentable subject matter); Tony Dutra, Computer, Medical Diagnostics, Gene Patents At Risk in
Light of Mayo, Panelists Contend, PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY (Apr. 4, 2012)
(“[Intel’s Tina] Chappell predicted that the court would view the algorithms that are typically
cited in software patents in the same way that it analyzed the law of nature in medical
diagnostics in Mayo.”).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 113–23.
21. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978).
22. Id. at 594.
23. Id. at 594–95.
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. . . for patent protection under § 101, . . . claims must be considered as a
whole.”24
In an earlier essay, Moderating Mayo, I argued that Mayo should be
interpreted as reviving a point-of-novelty approach.25 Although the Mayo
decision clearly reflected this perspective, the Supreme Court did not provide
any test for lower courts to apply. My essay filled this void by offering a
point-of-novelty test different from the rejected Flook test. This new pointof-novelty test follows from both Diehr and Mayo by considering the point of
novelty in the context of the claim as a whole.26 Assuming that an otherwise
unpatentable concept lies at the patent’s point of novelty, this two-part test
explains when other claim limitations add “enough” to the unpatentable
concept to make it patent-eligible.27
Although I previously explained how my test applied to different
variations of the medical diagnostics technology found in Mayo,28 I have not
explained how it would apply to software patents. The revised point-ofnovelty approach can also work in this context. The point of novelty of many
software patents is a mathematical formula or abstract idea.29 In an attempt
to minimize patent eligibility concerns, patent attorneys typically draft
software claims so that the idea is connected to a physical device.30 Under the
new point-of-novelty approach, that tactic should only be effective for
certain kinds of patents. Some of the ideas underlying software patents are
bound together with the physical components; for example, when a patent
claims a novel algorithm for curing rubber products, both the formula and
the physical components are necessary to accomplish the invention’s goals.31
Without the physical device, the formula could not achieve the goal of the
invention. Moreover, it makes no sense to discuss the formula apart from the
physical devices used to implement it. Thus, there is a sufficiently strong

24. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981).
25. Chao, supra note 15, at 432–33.
26. Id. at 436.
27. Id.; see infra text accompanying note 182 (discussing the basic modified point-ofnovelty test).
28. Chao, supra note 15, at 436–40.
29. Mathematical formulas are a type of law of nature that has frequently arisen in
software patent cases. See, e.g., Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590
(1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972). In addition, many of the recent
disputes before the Federal Circuit have centered on abstract ideas. See infra text
accompanying notes 93–98 and 139–63.
30. See infra note 186.
31. See infra Part II.
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nexus between the idea and the device such that the subject matter should be
patent-eligible.32
However, in many other cases, the idea underlying the software patent
lacks a strong nexus to the device.33 One example of such a patent is the
method for administering life insurance values claimed in Bancorp Services.34
Although the drafting of the patent attempts to establish a connection to a
computer, one is not actually required; the idea of administering life
insurance policy values makes perfect sense standing alone.35 Thus, the nexus
between the physical components and the idea is weak. In such cases,
attaching the idea to a machine should not be enough to make the concept
patentable.
The rubber-curing and life insurance policy administration examples
illustrate that the key to determining whether a software patent covers
eligible subject matter is assessing the strength of the nexus between the
patent’s point of novelty and the physical devices found in the other claim
limitations. Bits and pieces of this theory are scattered throughout both
Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedent,36 but neither court has fully
appreciated the point-of-novelty approach to subject matter patent eligibility.
When the approach is finally appreciated, patent law will finally have a
practical tool for distinguishing questionable business method patents from
other kinds of more deserving industrial software patents.37
In Part II, this Article describes the different types of software patents.
At one end of the spectrum are software patents that are little more than
business method patents. An example is the controversial Amazon one-click
patent (click only once to buy).38 Business method software patents have
been the subject of intense criticism and are often thought to burden
innovation. At the other end of the spectrum are industrial software patents.
From a policy perspective, these patents are indistinguishable from other
32. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191–93.
33. See infra Sections III.A, III.C.
34. Bancorp Servs. v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 687 F.3d 1266, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(“[T]he claims merely employ computers to track, reconcile, and administer a life insurance
policy with a stable value component—i.e., the computer simply performs more efficiently
what could otherwise be accomplished manually.”).
35. See id. at 1275.
36. See infra text accompanying notes 187–88.
37. As Brian Love suggests, this may be the “least bad” option for dealing with
problematic software patents. Brian J. Love, Why Patentable Subject Matter Matters for Software,
81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 1, 8–11 (2012).
38. David Orozco, Administrative Patent Levers, 117 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1, 22–23 n.119
(2012) (discussing Free Software Foundation’s boycott in response to Amazon’s assertion of
the one-click patent).
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industrial patents that are not implemented through software and these
patents have not been subject to the same criticism as their business method
cousins.
In Part III, this Article describes the two most recent Supreme Court
decisions on patent-eligible subject matter, Bilski 39 and Mayo,40 and the
subsequent Federal Circuit decisions on software patents. Bilski is important
for two reasons. First, it endorsed (for the most part) the machine-ortransformation test the Federal Circuit had previously adopted.41 Second,
although Bilski did not categorically reject business method patents, the
decision demonstrated a strong hostility towards them.42 Mayo is important
because the Supreme Court took a new tack and looked at subject matter
eligibility determinations from a point-of-novelty perspective.43
Unfortunately, these decisions have not yielded any clarity for software
patents. As Part III describes, different Federal Circuit panels have applied
different tests for determining when software patents are drawn to eligible
subject matter.
In Part IV, this Article describes the new point-of-novelty test that I
offered in my earlier work and explains how the test can be applied to
software patents. More specifically, my test concludes that software patents
are drawn to patent-eligible subject matter when the physical limitations (e.g.,
rubber molding machines) are bound together with—and necessary to—the
unpatentable concepts that lie at the patent’s point of novelty. To be clear, I
do not suggest that this view is the one I would take if I were given a clean
slate. Others have already proposed idealized solutions.44 But patent
applicants, examiners, litigants, and the lower courts need greater clarity
now.45 The goal of this Article is to find a realistic path out of the current
morass. Thus, the test described here is intended to be a practical solution
that works within the constraints of current Supreme Court jurisprudence,
satisfiying that jurisprudence in two important respects. First, the test should
39. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
40. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
41. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3221.
42. See id. at 3257.
43. See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1304.
44. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Michael Risch, Ted M. Sichelman & R. Polk Wagner, Life
After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1339–41 (2011) (proposing five factors for a scopebased § 101 determination); Kevin Emerson Collins, Bilski and the Ambiguity of “An
Unpatentable Abstract Idea,” 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 37 (2011) (proposing a more precise
framework for the exclusion of abstract ideas from patent eligibility).
45. See CLS Bank III, 717 F.3d 1269, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Moore, J., dissenting in
part) (noting that many other cases dealing with the patent eligibility of software patents are
pending in the Federal Circuit and district courts).
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achieve the Supreme Court’s desired results by eliminating most business
method software patents while retaining industrial software patents. Second,
the test also operates within the Supreme Court’s theoretical framework by
applying a point-of-novelty approach.
Finally, Part V is a “postscript” that describes the latest morass created
by the Federal Circuit in CLS Bank. The decision contains at least three
different analytical approaches. This Article labels the two primary
approaches as the “strong view” and “weak view” of § 101’s patent eligibility
requirement. There is also a third approach advocated by Judge Newman
alone that would substantially abandon the use of § 101 to determine patent
eligibility. Part V explains how the strong view is the only approach that
faithfully follows the recent Supreme Court decisions. The two other
approaches either implicitly (in the case of the weak view) or explicitly (in
Judge Newman’s opinion) reject the path the Supreme Court has taken.
Assuming that the Supreme Court will not suddenly reverse itself, Part V
explains why the point-of-novelty approach described here provides more
clarity than the strong view.
II.

CATEGORIES OF SOFTWARE PATENTS

Numerous commentators have been critical of software patents, arguing
that software patents discourage innovation,46 have unclear boundaries,47 and
are of low quality.48 According to a recent empirical study, software patents
include some of the most litigated patents, but on the whole are much less

46. E.g., FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER
BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 56 (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (“Many panelists and participants
expressed the view that software and Internet patents are impeding innovation.”); cf. Stuart
J.H. Graham, Robert P. Merges, Pam Samuelson & Ted Sichelman, High Technology
Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1255, 1262, 1289–90 (2009) (finding in a survey of start-up companies that (1) the first
mover advantage, not patent protection, was the most “important” means to “capture
competitive advantage” in the software industry; and (2) the majority of start-up companies
in the software industry hold no patents at all).
47. E.g., Peter S. Menell, A Method for Reforming the Patent System, 13 MICH. TELECOMM.
& TECH. L. REV. 487, 505–06 (2007) (“The boundaries of software and business method
patents are inherently ambiguous.”).
48. E.g., Love, supra note 37, at 8–9 (arguing that examiners allow “many overbroad
software applications to issue as patents”). But see John R. Allison & Ronald J. Mann,
Disputed Quality of Software Patents, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 297 (2007) (discussing an empirical
study which suggests that, with respect to disclosure of prior art, the quality of software
patents is not worse than the quality of patents in other fields).
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likely than other types of patents to be found valid and infringed.49 This
suggests that software patents take up disproportionate litigation resources,
while offering only a slight benefit in return.50 This may be because software
patents are one of the weapons of choice for non-practicing patent entities.51
Commentators have widely criticized the many patent lawsuits brought by
non-practicing entities for focusing resources on litigation instead of
innovation.52 In 2011, Congress even enacted a temporary program for
challenging the validity of business method patents.53
While these criticisms of software patents as a category are valid in some
cases, there are many different kinds of software patents.54 One kind is the
business method patent. Business method patents like those in CLS Bank
(covering a trading system platform for exchanging obligations)55 and Bancorp
Services (covering a system for administering and tracking life insurance
values) lie at the heart of the controversy.56 Many of the claims in both cases
explicitly contained computer-based limitations or have been interpreted to
49. John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Patent Quality and Settlement
Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 707–08 (2011).
50. Id. at 708.
51. Brian J. Love, An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation Timing: Could a Patent Term
Reduction Decimate Trolls Without Harming Innovators?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1343 (2013)
(finding that about 40% of assertions by non-practicing entities were brought to enforce
software patents).
52. See, e.g., President’s Council of Economic Advisers, the National Economic
Council, and the Office of Science & Technology Policy, Patent Assertion and U.S. Innovation 5
(2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf
(discussing the relationship between patent assertion entities and software patents); Ted
Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 368 (2010) (saying that nonpracticing entities stifle commercialization of patented inventions by “exploit[ing] litigation
and licensing market defects to extract unwarranted rents”).
53. Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18, 125 Stat. 284, 329–31 (2011).
54. Compare Allison & Mann, supra note 48, at 308–09 (defining a software patent
broadly as “one in which at least one claim element covers data processing—that is, the act
of manipulating data—regardless of whether the code carrying out that data processing is on
a magnetic storage medium or embedded in a chip”), with Stuart J.H. Graham & David C.
Mowery, Intellectual Property Protection in the U.S. Software Industry, in PATENTS IN THE
KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 219, 232 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill, eds.,
Committee on Intellectual Property Rights in the Knowledge-Based Economy, National
Research Council, 2003) (identifying software patents based on the industry characteristics;
this results in a narrower set).
55. Terry Baynes, Federal Circuit finds business method patentable, THOMSON REUTERS
NEWS & INSIGHT, July 9, 2012, available at http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/
New_York/News/2012/07_-_July/Federal_Circuit_finds_business_method_patentable
(describing the patents in CLS Bank as business method patents).
56. CLS Bank I, 685 F.3d 1341, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2012), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated,
484 F. App’x 559 (Fed. Cir. 2012), aff’d en banc, 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Bancorp
Servs. v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 687 F.3d 1266, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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require implementation on a computer.57 The true focus of these patents,
however, is on the business method itself.
Another kind of software patent is the industrial method patent.58 For
example, the patents in both Parker v. Flook59 and Diamond v. Diehr 60 used new
algorithms in industrial applications. In Flook, the claims involved a formula
for calculating an alarm limit for a catalytic chemical conversion of
hydrocarbons.61 The patent in Diehr used a mathematical equation to develop
a new process for molding and curing raw rubber into products.62 Both
patents were implemented with software.63
Of course, not every software patent can be easily classified as either a
business method patent or an industrial patent. Some patents, for instance,
operate solely on computers, like most business method software patents,
but also improve the performance of a physical machine (i.e., the computer),
like most industrial software patents. The patents in Research Corporation
Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft fall within this middle ground.64 The patents in that
case covered a particular method of digital image halftoning, which allowed
computers to present many shades and color tones using only a limited
number of pixel colors.65 The claims did not require any physical device other
than a computer. This might suggest that the patents were business method
software patents. However, the technology was used to improve images
displayed on printers and displays.66 Thus, they could also be thought of as
industrial software patents. Ultimately, any rule the Federal Circuit issues
concerning patentable subject matter must be able to address all types of
software patents, including those that do not fit easily into a discrete
category.

57. CLS Bank I, 685 F.3d at 1344; Bancorp Servs., 687 F.3d at 1271.
58. There is similar concept in Europe where such software patents are said to have
“technical effect.” See Patrick E. King, Ryan M. Roberts & Andrew V. Moshirnia, The
Confluence of European Activism and American Minimalism: Patentable Subject Matter After Bilski, 27
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 247, 258–59 (2011) (discussing interpretations
of patentability requirements under Article 52 of the European Patent Convention).
59. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978).
60. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981).
61. Flook, 437 U.S. at 585.
62. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187.
63. Flook, 437 U.S. at 586; Diehr, 450 U.S. at 177.
64. Research Corp. Techs. Inc., v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 862–63 (Fed. Cir.
2010).
65. Id. This technology is used to enhance the images found on computer displays and
printers.
66. Notably, the claims at issue did not actually require the printers or display devices.
See, for example, claim 1 of the ’310 patent. Id. at 865.
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There are a variety of reasons why many of the criticisms of software
patents generally do not apply well to industrial software patents. First, the
boundaries of these patents are not as amorphous as those of many business
method software patents because the scopes of most industrial software
patents are tied to particular applications.67 Second, conventional wisdom
suggests that the non-practicing entity problem is greater with respect to
business method patents than to industrial software patents.68 Third, many of
the critiques of software patents focus on patents held by software
companies; these companies, however, typically do not hold industrial
software patents.69
As a practical matter, the Federal Circuit was unlikely to declare in its en
banc review of CLS Bank that industrial software patents are per se ineligible.
Such a rule would disturb the settled expectations of too many industries that
rely on industrial software patents to protect their intellectual property
rights.70 Additionally, a decision eliminating industrial software patents could
violate the United States’ obligations under international law.71 Thus, the only
real question on the table for the Federal Circuit in CLS Bank was whether to
rule that some software patents are ineligible even when the claims tie the

67. Even the Supreme Court has expressed concern about “vagueness and suspect
validity of some of these [business method] patents.” eBay Inc. v. MercExchange LLC, 547
U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
68. See Orozco, supra note 38, at 15–23 (discussing the problem of business method
patent assertions by non-practicing entities). But see Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, SETON
HALL L. REV. 457, 477 (2012) (suggesting that “business methods are a relatively small part
of NPE litigation, perhaps smaller than conventional wisdom might assume”).
69. This is not surprising given how software patents are classified. See Graham et al.,
supra note 46, at 1268–69 n.41, 1271 n.46 (selecting primarily software companies for the
authors’ survey sample). In a different article, Graham and Mowery define software patents
to actually exclude “embedded software” that is directly incorporated into a product and
whose operation is typically not controlled by the user. Graham & Mowery, supra note 54, at
235–36. Of course these are typically industrial software patents.
70. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 739 (2002)
(explaining that a fundamental change to patent law could “risk destroying the legitimate
expectations of inventors in their property”).
71. See Eric Keller, Time-Varying Compulsory License: Facilitating License Negotiation for
Efficient Post-Verdict Patent Infringement, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 427, 439 (“Solutions that
discriminate in the protection of patent rights based on ‘field of technology’ may also run
afoul of treaty obligations under TRIPS Article 27.1.”); Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round
vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) (subject to certain permissible exceptions, “patents shall be
available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology,
provided that they are new, involve an inventive step, and are capable of industrial
application”).
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software to a computer. Unfortunately, the splintered decision provided no
helpful guidance whatsoever.72
The point-of-novelty approach described in Part IV naturally
distinguishes between industrial and business method patents and offers a
framework that suggests that most business method software patents are
ineligible for patent protection. The proposal is not intended to be an ideal
solution divorced from reality. Rather, it draws upon existing concepts found
in both Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedent to create a test for
patent eligibility that meets the goals of the courts and commentators alike.
But before providing the details of this approach, Part III describes how
recent case law has addressed subject matter patent eligibility, particularly as
applied to software patents.
III.

THE FRACTURED JURISPRUDENCE

The two most recent Supreme Court cases on subject matter patent
eligibility place very different constraints on how the Federal Circuit must
think about software patents. Bilski offers the machine-or-transformation test
as one possible test for analyzing subject matter patent eligibility.73 But just as
importantly, Bilski shows a strong hostility towards business method patents,
albeit for different reasons.74 In contrast, Mayo says nothing about business
method patents, but offers an entirely different analytical approach, which
implicitly requires a point-of-novelty framework.75 The decision from the
Federal Circuit in CLS Bank had to account for these two different strands of
thinking.
A.

BILSKI V. KAPPOS

In Bilski, the Supreme Court evaluated the patent eligibility of a
procedure for instructing buyers and sellers on how to protect against the
risk of price fluctuations in a discrete section of the economy.76 Although the
Court unanimously concluded that Bilski’s claims did not cover patenteligible subject matter, there was significant disagreement about how to reach
that conclusion.
The Court considered two proposed limitations under § 101: the
machine-or-transformation test and the categorical exclusion of business
method patents. Writing the opinion of the Court, Justice Kennedy first
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

See infra Part V (discussing the different opinions from CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp.).
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010).
See id. at 3228–29.
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3223–24.

2013]

NOVELTY IN SOFTWARE PATENTS

1229

addressed the machine-or-transformation test.77 The underlying Federal
Circuit decision had held that the machine-or-transformation test was the
sole test for determining the patentability of a “process” under § 101.78 In
other words, a process was only patentable if it was tied to a particular
machine or transformed an article to another state.79 The Supreme Court
decision modified that holding, finding that the machine-or-transformation
test may be “a useful and important clue” or “investigative tool,” but it is
“not the sole test for deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible
‘process’ ” under § 101.80
Speaking for only four members of the Court, Justice Kennedy’s opinion
recognized that it was unclear how the machine-or-transformation test might
apply to software patents.81 On the one hand, “[t]he machine-ortransformation test may well provide a sufficient basis for evaluating
processes similar to those in the Industrial Age—for example, inventions
grounded in a physical or other tangible form.”82 On the other hand, Justice
Kennedy recognized that the machine-or-transformation test “would create
uncertainty as to the patentability of software, advanced diagnostic medicine
techniques, and inventions based on linear programming, data compression,
and the manipulation of digital signals.”83 In fact, Justice Kennedy went out
of his way to say that he was “not commenting on the patentability of any
particular invention, let alone holding that any of the above-mentioned
technologies from the Information Age should or should not receive patent
protection.”84
While the entire Court agreed that the machine-or-transformation test
was not an exclusive test, the justices differed sharply on the eligibility of
business method patents. The majority held that § 101 does not categorically
exclude business method patents.85 Indeed, the opinion questioned whether
there was even a common understanding of the term “business method
patents.”86 Four members of the Court disagreed, arguing that business
77. Justices Roberts, Thomas, and Alito joined the opinion in full while Justice Scalia
only joined part of the opinion. Id. at 3223.
78. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
79. Id. at 956.
80. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227.
81. Justice Scalia did not join in this part of Justice Kennedy’s opinion. Id. at 3223.
82. Id. at 3227.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 3228.
85. Id. at 3227. Justices Roberts, Thomas, Alito and Scalia joined Justice Kennedy in
this part of the opinion. Id. at 3223.
86. See id. at 3228 (“Nor is it clear how far a prohibition on business method patents
would reach, and whether it would exclude technologies for conducting a business more
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methods are categorically unpatentable. Relying chiefly on a lengthy historical
analysis, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor,
argued that Bilski’s “method is not a ‘process’ [under § 101] because it
describes only a general method of engaging in business transactions—and
business methods are not patentable.”87 Although Stevens did not define
what a business method patent was, his opinion provided plenty of examples,
including insuring against loss by bad debt, a method of abbreviating rail
tariff schedules, the cafeteria system for transacting a restaurant business, and
a diaper service.88
After Bilski, it appeared that business method patents had survived, but
just barely. Four Justices would have categorically excluded business method
patents.89 Moreover, even Justice Kennedy’s opinion explicitly left the door
open for further restrictions on business method patents.90 Since most
business method patents fall within the category of software patents,91 it is
not surprising that the Federal Circuit has given software patents more
scrutiny.
Soon after Bilski, the Federal Circuit issued three inconsistent decisions
on the patent eligibility of business method software patents. In Ultramercial v.
Hulu, the court faced a § 101 challenge to a patent claiming “a method for
distributing copyrighted products (e.g., songs, movies, books) over the
Internet.”92 The decision characterized the underlying idea as using
advertising as currency.93 This idea was admittedly abstract, but the Federal
Circuit noted that the claimed steps were “likely to require intricate and
efficiently.”); see, e.g., Bronwyn H. Hall, Business and Financial Method Patents, Innovation, and
Policy, 56 SCOT. J. POL. ECON. 443, 445 (2009) (“There is no precise definition of business
method patents.”).
87. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3232.
88. Id. at 3246–48.
89. Id. at 3257.
90. Id. at 3231. The Court stated:
It may be that the Court of Appeals thought it needed to make the
machine-or-transformation test exclusive precisely because its case law
had not adequately identified less extreme means of restricting business
method patents . . . . In disapproving an exclusive machine-ortransformation test, we by no means foreclose the Federal Circuit’s
development of other limiting criteria that further the purposes of the
Patent Act and are not inconsistent with its text.
Id.
91. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 187 (2008).
92. Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 657 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated sub nom.,
Wildtangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 2431 (2012).
93. Id. at 1328, 1330.
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complex computer programming” and could only be performed on the
Internet.94 The court held that because all the claims connected the
underlying concept to a computer or the Internet, they were patent eligible.95
But two other decisions arrived at very different results. In CyberSource v.
Retail Decisions, the Federal Circuit found that a patent related to a “method
and system for detecting fraud in a credit card transaction between [a]
consumer and a merchant over the internet” was not patent eligible.96 The
Federal Circuit reasoned that the ideas underlying the software claims were
not sufficiently connected with their computer-based limitations to satisfy the
machine-or-transformation test.97 The Federal Circuit in Dealertrack v. Huber
also suggested that adding computer limitations to a claim would not render
every concept patent eligible.98 In Dealertrack, the patents related to a
computer-aided method and system for processing credit applications over
electronic networks.99 Even though some of the claims explicitly required the
Internet, the Federal Circuit found that this recitation was insufficient
because “the claims . . . recite[d] only that the method is ‘computer aided’
without specifying any level of involvement or detail.”100 Moreover, the court
concluded that the claims preempted a fundamental concept.101 Thus,
Dealertrack appeared to expand the potential grounds for rejecting a software
patent on subject matter patent eligibility grounds.
These decisions could be interpreted to suggest that software patents are
drawn to eligible subject matter when the computer limitations are more
complex, or simply have more steps. Indeed, a comparison of the central
claims in these cases shows that CyberSource struck down a claim with three
computer steps,102 while Ultramercial upheld a claim with eleven computer
94. Id. at 1328.
95. Id.
96. CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
97. Id. at 1375.
98. See Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
99. Id. at 1317.
100. Id. at 1334.
101. See id. at 1333 (“Neither Dealertrack nor any other entity is entitled to wholly
preempt the clearinghouse concept.”).
102. CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Claim 3 recites:
A method for verifying the validity of a credit card transaction over the
Internet comprising the steps of: a) obtaining information about other
transactions that have utilized an Internet address that is identified with
the [ ] credit card transaction; b) constructing a map of credit card
numbers based upon the other transactions and; c) utilizing the map of
credit card numbers to determine if the credit card transaction is valid.
Id.
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steps.103 But making subject matter eligibility determinations based on how
many detailed (and often inconsequential) steps a patent attorney can draft
makes little sense. Most observers simply viewed the decisions as
inconsistent.104 Thus, Bilski did not result in any clarity for standards of
patentability for software.105 Mayo was decided immediately on the heels of
103. Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 657 F.3d 1323, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(discussing claim 1 of the ’545 patent). Claim 1 recites:
A method for distribution of products over the Internet via a facilitator,
said method comprising the steps of: a first step of receiving, from a
content provider, media products that are covered by intellectual property
rights protection and are available for purchase, wherein each said media
product being comprised of at least one of text data, music data, and
video data; a second step of selecting a sponsor message to be associated
with the media product, said sponsor message being selected from a
plurality of sponsor messages, said second step including accessing an
activity log to verify that the total number of times which the sponsor
message has been previously presented is less than the number of
transaction cycles contracted by the sponsor of the sponsor message; a
third step of providing the media product for sale at an Internet website; a
fourth step of restricting general public access to said media product; a
fifth step of offering to a consumer access to the media product without
charge to the consumer on the precondition that the consumer views the
sponsor message; a sixth step of receiving from the consumer a request to
view the sponsor message, wherein the consumer submits said request in
response to being offered access to the media product; a seventh step of,
in response to receiving the request from the consumer, facilitating the
display of a sponsor message to the consumer; an eighth step of, if the
sponsor message is not an interactive message, allowing said consumer
access to said media product after said step of facilitating the display of
said sponsor message; a ninth step of, if the sponsor message is an
interactive message, presenting at least one query to the consumer and
allowing said consumer access to said media product after receiving a
response to said at least one query; a tenth step of recording the
transaction event to the activity log, said tenth step including updating the
total number of times the sponsor message has been presented; and an
eleventh step of receiving payment from the sponsor of the sponsor
message displayed.
Id.
104. See, e.g., Recent Case, CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366
(Fed. Cir. 2011), 125 HARV. L. REV. 851, 857 (2012) (noting that the Ultramercial court’s
attempt to distinguish Cybersource seems forced); Kelly J. Kubasta, Litigation Affecting Five Key
Patent Law Areas, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 2012 57, 62 (Eddie Fournier ed., 2012)
(“Unfortunately, the result of CyberSource and Ultramercial is quite unclear and it remains
uncertain as to where the line will be drawn as to software and methods as patent-eligible
subject matter.”).
105. See N. Scott Pierce, A Great Invisible Crashing: The Rise And Fall Of Patent Eligibility
Through Mayo v. Prometheus, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 186, 189–90
(2012) (“[T]here is little to guide . . . Federal Circuit cases that have issued since Bilski and
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CyberSource, Ultramercial, and Dealertrack. Ideally, the Supreme Court would
have addressed the Federal Circuit’s conflicting case law and provided a
framework for making subject matter eligibility determinations, particularly in
the area of software patents. Unfortunately, Mayo just created more
confusion.
B.

MAYO V. PROMETHEUS

Although the technology in Mayo related to medical diagnostic testing,106
the approach the Court laid out has significant implications for software
patents.107 The inventors of Prometheus’ claimed methods discovered a
specific correlation between the levels of metabolized drug in the body and
the optimal drug dosage.108 Two patents were issued on this discovery, both
claiming a method for determining the level of the metabolized drug in a
subject and informing a doctor to adjust the dosage within specific
parameters.109 The defendants argued that the claims were not drawn to
patent-eligible subject matter as required by § 101, and this issue eventually
made its way to the Supreme Court.110
A unanimous Court held that Prometheus’ claims were not patent
eligible.111 The decision first noted that “Prometheus’ patents set forth laws
of nature—namely, relationships between concentrations of certain
metabolites in the blood and the likelihood that a dosage of a thiopurine drug
will prove ineffective or cause harm.”112 Accordingly, the Supreme Court
framed the question by asking, “do the patent claims add enough to their
statement of the correlations to allow the processes they describe to qualify
as patent-eligible processes that apply natural laws?”113
Relying on an examination of each of the claimed limitations, the
Supreme Court answered its own question by saying “no.”114 The decision
first examined a step of “administering” the particular drug.115 According to
the Court, this step simply limited the use of the correlation to the relevant
the Supreme Court’s apparent encouragement to lower courts to continue to develop new
tests of patent eligibility reflect a continuing potential for confusion.”).
106. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012).
107. Indeed, the Supreme Court vacated Ultramercial and remanded it to the Federal
Circuit in light of Mayo. WildTangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 2431 (2012).
108. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1295.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1304.
112. Id. at 1296.
113. Id. at 1297.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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audience: doctors.116 Since limiting the use of an abstract idea to a particular
technological environment cannot circumvent the prohibition against
patenting abstract ideas, that step did not render the claims patentable.117
Second, the Court examined two “wherein” limitations that noted the
correlation between particular drug metabolite levels and a need to change
the dosage.118 The Court characterized these limitations as “simply tell[ing] a
doctor about the relevant laws, at most adding a suggestion that he should
take those laws into account when treating his patient.”119 The decision said
nothing more on the topic, apparently indicating that these limitations clearly
could not change an unpatentable concept into a patentable application.
Third, the decision turned to the step of “determining” the level of the drug’s
metabolite in the body.120 This step was well known in the prior art.121 Since
conventional or obvious pre-solution activity is not normally sufficient to
transform an unpatentable law of nature into a patent-eligible application, the
Court disregarded this step as well.122 The Court concluded that none of the
limitations, individually or in combination, were sufficient “to transform the
nature of the claim.”123 In short, the Supreme Court determined that three
types of limitations do not make an unpatentable idea patent eligible:
(1) limiting an unpatentable concept to a particular audience, (2) telling
someone about the concept, or (3) adding a conventional or obvious presolution activity.124
After determining that the claims did not add “enough” to the
unpatentable idea at the heart of the invention,125 the Supreme Court pursued
three additional lines of analysis that ostensibly corroborated its conclusion. I
previously criticized these dicta because they are analytically weak and

116. Id.
117. Id. (citing In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
118. The Court quoted the following limitations:
[W]herein the level of 6-thioguanine less than about 230 pmol per 8x108
red blood cells indicates a need to increase the amount of said drug
subsequently administered to said subject and wherein the level of 6thioguanine greater than about 400 pmol per 8x108 red blood cells
indicates a need to decrease the amount of said drug subsequently
administered to said subject.
Id. at 1295 (citing U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 col.20 ll.10–20 (filed Apr. 8, 1999)).
119. Id. at 1297.
120. Id. at 1297–98.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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difficult to apply.126 I provide an abbreviated version of my critique here with
a few refinements. First, the decision used two earlier Supreme Court
decisions as guideposts, Parker v. Flook127 and Diamond v. Diehr,128 and
suggested that Prometheus’ claims were closer to the ineligible claims in
Flook than the eligible claims in Diehr.129 These guideposts are problematic
because—as many commentators have noted—the distinction between Flook
and Diehr is unclear, and may be nonexistent.130 Both cases appear to apply a
new formula to an industrial process. Even the Mayo Court appeared to have
trouble explaining just why the additional steps in Diehr rendered its claims
patent eligible.131
Second, the Court said that simply appending general limitations to a
concept is just like saying “apply it,” and clearly is insufficient to render an
unpatentable law of nature patent eligible.132 This line of inquiry is also
troublesome. The complaint about general limitations appears disingenuous.
The claims in Mayo were quite specific; they identified particular levels of
particular drug metabolites that would indicate when the dosing should
change. Thus, this line of inquiry really appears to be an unhelpful “know it
when you see it” kind of analysis.133
Third, the Court said that Prometheus’ claims were too broad and
impermissibly tied up the future use of a law of nature.134 This issue is often
framed as a question of preemption: Does the claim preempt all uses of the
unpatentable concept (e.g., law of nature or abstract idea)?135 But this
preemption test can easily be manipulated. Almost any claim can be
126. Chao, supra note 15, at 429–32.
127. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
128. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
129. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298–1300.
130. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Point of Novelty, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1253, 1278 (2011)
(characterizing the claims in Diehr and Flook as “almost exactly parallel”); Kevin Emerson
Collins, Propertizing Thought, 60 S.M.U. L. REV. 317, 349 (2007) (“Flook and Diehr are difficult
to reconcile.”).
131. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1299 (only saying that “[t]hese other steps apparently added to the
formula something that in terms of patent law’s objectives had significance—they transformed
the process into an inventive application of the formula.” (emphasis added)).
132. Id. at 1300.
133. See CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 685 F.3d 1341, 1348–52 (Prost, J., dissenting); see
also infra text accompanying notes 148–49.
134. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1301–02.
135. See id. at 1301; see, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010) (“Allowing
petitioners to patent risk hedging would pre-empt use of this approach in all fields, and
would effectively grant a monopoly over an abstract idea.”); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S.
175, 185 (1981) (stating that no one can patent “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas”).
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characterized as too broad if the concept is defined narrowly.136 Mayo
provides a good example of this problem. The Supreme Court defined the
natural laws at issue as “the relationships between the concentration in the
blood of certain thiopurine metabolites and the likelihood that the drug
dosage will be ineffective or induce harmful side-effects.”137 However, the
Court could have just as easily said that the natural law was the effect that
thiopurine had on humans. Alternatively, the natural law could have been the
understanding that a reduction in any drug dose leads to lower levels of the
corresponding metabolite in the body. If the natural law were characterized
in either of these fashions, the claims would have been drawn to one narrow
application. In other words, the claims would not have preempted all
applications of the natural law, suggesting that they were drawn to eligible
subject matter.
Importantly, Mayo did not apply (or reject) the machine-ortransformation test, which had effectively emerged as the only test for
determining patent eligibility after Bilski.138 Instead, the Supreme Court
merely said “we have neither said nor implied that the [machine-ortransformation] test trumps the ‘law of nature’ exclusion. That being so, the
test fails here.”139 The Court then proceeded to apply its new approach. By
assessing whether a claim’s limitations added “enough” to the law of nature
that Prometheus’ inventors had discovered, Mayo outlined another line of
inquiry to examine. But that was not all. The three corroborating
justifications provided even more fodder for the lower courts to chew upon.
Given all these varied and difficult ways to assess patent eligibility, it is not
surprising that there continued to be disagreement within the Federal Circuit.
C.

THE POST-MAYO SPLIT

CLS Bank International v. Alice Corp.140 was the first Federal Circuit
decision to address the eligibility of software patents after Mayo. The central
idea underlying the patents in CLS Bank related to exchanging obligations

136. See Tun-Jen Chiang, The Rules and Standards of Patentable Subject Matter, 2010 WIS. L.
REV. 1353, 1369–71 (2010) (explaining how claims can be viewed at different levels of
abstraction).
137. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294.
138. See Lemley et al., supra note 44, at 1316 (“[T]he U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO), patent litigants, and district courts have all continued to rely on the machine-ortransformation test in the wake of Bilski: no longer as the sole rule, but as a presumptive
starting point that threatens to become effectively mandatory.”).
139. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1303 (internal citations omitted).
140. CLS Bank I, 685 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2012), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 484
F. App’x 559 (Fed. Cir. 2012), aff’d en banc, 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
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using a third party to eliminate risk.141 Although the patents contained both
method and system claims, they all used a computer and the court said that
the “form of the claim” did not change the patent eligibility analysis.142
Although the majority opinion in CLS Bank discussed the recent
Supreme Court decision in Mayo, the decision had little impact on the rule
the majority announced.143 Judge Linn, joined by Judge O’Malley, wrote:
“[T]his court holds that when—after taking all of the claim recitations into
consideration—it is not manifestly evident that a claim is directed to a patent
ineligible abstract idea, that claim must not be deemed for that reason to be
inadequate under § 101.”144 But the “manifestly evident ” language is not from
Mayo or even from Bilski. It comes from Research Corp. Technologies v.
Microsoft 145 and Ultramercial v. Hulu,146 two Federal Circuit decisions that were
decided prior to Mayo. The majority in CLS Bank interpreted the “manifestly
evident ” rule in an even more patent friendly way, stating that a claim is only
drawn to unpatentable subject matter if “the single most reasonable
understanding is that a claim is directed to nothing more than a fundamental
truth or disembodied concept . . . .”147 Under this standard, it was easy for
the Federal Circuit to find that Alice’s patents covered patent-eligible subject
matter.
CLS Bank does not follow Mayo’s approach, which focuses on whether
certain claim limitations add “enough” to the unpatentable abstract concept
to render it patent eligible.148 To be fair, at the very end of the opinion, the
majority paid lip service to Mayo by characterizing some claim limitations as
being “integral” to the method, “playing a significant part in permitting the
method to be performed.”149 Judge Prost’s dissent challenged these
statements and argued that the majority did “not explain whether [the
141. Id. at 1343.
142. Id. at 1353.
143. See id. at 1348, 1350–51.
144. Id. at 1352 (emphasis added).
145. See Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 868 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (stating that a “disqualifying characteristic should exhibit itself so manifestly as to
override the broad statutory categories of eligible subject matter”).
146. See Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 657 F.3d 1323, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing
Research Corp., 627 F.3d at 868), vacated sub nom. WildTangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, 132
S. Ct. 2431 (2012).
147. CLS Bank I, 685 F.3d at 1352.
148. Judge Prost’s dissent also noticed this problem and criticized the majority for
failing to follow the Supreme Court’s approach. CLS Bank I, 685 F.3d at 1357 (Prost, J.,
dissenting); see also Robert D. Swanson, Note, Section 101 and Computer-Implemented Inventions,
16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 161, 166 (2012) (noting that a “manifestly abstract” test is
inconsistent with both Bilski and Mayo).
149. CLS Bank I, 685 F.3d at 1355.
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additional limitations] should be characterized as such, and what ‘integral’
means in the context of § 101 in the first place.”150
Although the majority’s statements were conclusory, the dissent’s
approach was hardly more illuminating. It provided a simplified description
of the claims and found: “The claim in effect presents an abstract idea and
then says ‘apply it.’ That is not enough.”151 Although this construct is clearly
found in Mayo, it is unhelpful. Both the majority and dissent believe that they
know a claim directed at an unpatentable abstract idea when they see it, but
they clearly see particular claims differently.
Two weeks after CLS Bank, the Federal Circuit decided Bancorp Services v.
Sun Life,152 which only added to the confusion. In Bancorp, the patents
covered both system and method claims for administering and tracking the
values of life insurance policies in separate accounts.153 Some of the method
claims did not have to be implemented on a computer while all the remaining
claims did. Despite these differences, the Federal Circuit treated all the claims
“as equivalent for purposes of patent eligibility under § 101.”154
This time the Federal Circuit applied a variation of the Mayo approach
that was specifically tailored to software patents. After reviewing the § 101
jurisprudence, the court in Bancorp Services declared, “To salvage an otherwise
patent-ineligible process, a computer must be integral to the claimed
invention, facilitating the process in a way that a person making calculations
or computations could not.”155
Applying this test, the Federal Circuit identified an unpatentable abstract
idea underlying the claims—“managing a stable value protected life insurance
policy and then instructing the use of well-known calculations to help
establish some of the inputs into the equation.”156 Even though many of the
claims also required a computer, the court found that “[t]he computer
required by . . . Bancorp’s claims is employed only for its most basic
function, the performance of repetitive calculations, and as such does not
impose meaningful limits on the scope of those claims.”157 The Federal
Circuit emphasized the limited role computers played in Bancorp’s claim,
150. Id. at 1357 (emphasis omitted).
151. Id. at 1358 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct.
1289, 1294 (2012)).
152. Bancorp Servs. v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 687 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
153. Id. at 1270–72.
154. Id. at 1277.
155. Id. at 1278 (citing SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1333
(Fed. Cir. 2010)).
156. Id. (citing Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010)) (brackets omitted).
157. Id.
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finding that “[i]t is the management of the life insurance policy that is
‘integral to each of Bancorp’s claims at issue,’ not the computer machinery
that may be used to accomplish it”; the determination of the values in the
claims was “a matter of mere mathematical computation.”158
Notably, Bancorp Services did not explicitly reject, nor did it discuss, CLS
Bank’s “manifestly evident” rule.159 Rather, Bancorp Services distinguished the
outcome in CLS Bank by saying that the computer limitations in CLS Bank
played a “significant part in the performance of [that] invention or that the
claims were limited to a very specific application . . . .”160 Even though Bancorp
Services attempted to reconcile its holding with CLS Bank, these cases took
fundamentally different approaches to analyzing the patent eligibility of
software patents.161
Under the Bancorp Services approach, a court dissects a claim to determine
whether there is an unpatentable abstract idea at its core.162 If there is, the
court then determines whether any computer limitations are “integral” to the
claimed invention.163 In contrast, the CLS Bank approach looks at a claim as
a whole and seeks to determine whether it is “manifestly evident that [the]
claim is directed to a patent ineligible abstract idea.”164
Given this disagreement, it is not surprising that the Federal Circuit
decided to rehear CLS Bank en banc. The order granting the petition asked,
“What test should the court adopt to determine whether a computerimplemented invention is a patent ineligible ‘abstract idea’; and when, if ever,
does the presence of a computer in a claim lend patent eligibility to an

158. Id. at 1279–80.
159. See id.; CLS Bank I, 685 F.3d 1341, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2012), reh’g en banc granted, opinion
vacated, 484 F. App’x 559 (Fed. Cir. 2012), aff’d en banc, 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
160. Bancorp, 687 F.3d at 1280 (citing CLS Bank I, 685 F.3d at 1355).
161. Dennis Crouch, Ongoing Debate: Is Software Patentable?, PATENTLY-O (July 27 2012,
3:53 PM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/07/ongoing-debate-is-software-patentable.html
(“Despite this attempted reconciliation, it is clear that the CLS majority has a different
approach to subject matter eligibility questions [than Bancorp].”); see also Eric Guttag, Bancorp
Services: Further Fracturing of the Patent Eligibility Landscape for Business Methods and Systems,
IPWATCHDOG (July 27, 2012, 11:15 AM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/07/27/
bancorp-services-further-fracturing-of-the-patent-eligibility-landscape-for-business-methodsand-systems/id=26881/ (characterizing Bancorp as “yet more evidence of the further
fracturing of the patent-eligibility landscape”).
162. Bancorp, 687 F.3d at 1276.
163. Id. at 1278.
164. CLS Bank I, 685 F.3d 1341, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2012), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated,
484 F. App’x 559 (Fed. Cir. 2012), aff’d en banc, 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (emphasis
added).
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otherwise patent-ineligible idea?”165 In the following Part, I argue that the
point-of-novelty approach answers the question the Federal Circuit
presented.
IV.

A POINT-OF-NOVELTY RESOLUTION

Because Mayo only identified categories of claim limitations that failed to
render an unpatentable concept patent eligible, many worried that Mayo
might radically limit patent-eligible subject matter.166 One commentator went
so far as to say that the decision “creates a framework for patent eligibility in
which almost any method claim can be invalidated.”167 My earlier essay,
Moderating Mayo, offered a more restrained interpretation of the Supreme
Court decision. I argued that Mayo implicitly adopted a point-of-novelty
approach, and that this approach did not need to radically limit patent
eligibility in the way many feared.168
The point of novelty is the claim limitation or limitations that correspond
to the heart or gist of the invention.169 Historically, patent law has refused to
consider a patent’s point of novelty in a wide-ranging number of doctrines.170
Both Mark Lemley and I have separately criticized that jurisprudence. As
Lemley said, “It makes little sense for a law focused on invention to pay no
attention to what is inventive about the patentee’s technology.”171 More
165. CLS Bank II, 484 F. App’x 559, 559 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (order granting hearing en
banc). The order also asked whether the form of the claim matters (i.e., method, system, or
storage medium claims). Id. at 559–60.
166. See, e.g., Gene Quinn, Killing Industry: The Supreme Court Blows Mayo v. Prometheus,
IPWATCHDOG (Mar. 20, 2012, 1:44 PM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/03/20/
supreme-court-mayo-v-prometheus/id=22920/ (“The sky is falling! . . . Those in the
biotech, medical diagnostics and pharmaceutical industries have just been taken out behind
the woodshed and summarily executed . . . .”); see also supra note 19.
167. Robert R. Sachs, Punishing Prometheus: The Supreme Court’s Blunders in Mayo v.
Prometheus, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 26, 2002, 8:10 AM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/
2012/03/punishing-prometheus-the-supreme-courts-blunders-in-mayo-v-prometheus.html.
168. Chao, supra note 15, at 425.
169. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. 365 U.S. 336, 344–45 (1961)
(“[T]here is no legally recognizable or protected ‘essential’ element, ‘gist’ or ‘heart’ of the
invention in a combination patent.”).
170. Bernard Chao, Breaking Aro’s Commandment: Recognizing that Inventions Have Heart, 20
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1183, 1192 (explaining that the point of
novelty has been rejected in assessing direct infringement, anticipation, obviousness, the
written description requirement, and repair and reconstruction).
171. Lemley, Point of Novelty, supra note 130, at 1274–75; see also Kevin Emerson Collins,
Getting into the “Spirit” of Innovative Things: Looking to Complementary and Substitute Properties to
Shape Patent Protection for Improvement, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1217, 1237 (2011) (arguing
that the failure to consider the point of novelty is “highly problematic in the context of
patent protection for improvements.”).
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specifically, I argued that the point of novelty “should play an important
role” in subject matter patent eligibility determinations.172 The Mayo Court
appears to implicitly embrace this view. Mayo’s approach assessed whether a
patent’s point of novelty was an unpatentable concept (i.e., law of nature,
natural phenomenon, or abstract idea) and then determined whether any
claim limitations somehow transformed that concept into a patent-eligible
application.173
To be clear, Mayo’s approach is very different from the point-of-novelty
approach the Supreme Court applied years ago in Parker v. Flook.174 The
claims in Flook involved a new formula for calculating an alarm limit for a
catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons.175 The claimed process
contained three steps: “an initial step which merely measures the present
value of the process variable (e.g., the temperature); an intermediate step
which uses an algorithm to calculate an updated alarm-limit value; and a final
step in which the actual alarm limit is adjusted to the updated value.”176 The
Supreme Court found that the invention was not patent-eligible “because
once [the] algorithm is assumed to be within the prior art, the application,
considered as a whole, contains no patentable invention.”177 Thus, Flook
suggested that a claim’s point of novelty could not be based on an
unpatentable concept.178
Diehr appears to have later rejected the Flook point-of-novelty analysis,179
and Mayo did not revive it. Although Mayo also focused on a patent’s point of
novelty, the decision did not assume that the point of novelty was in the
prior art and require that other limitations be “new.” Rather, Mayo focused
on the natural law that corresponded to the claimed point of novelty and
asked if the other limitations added enough to that concept to render the

172. Chao, supra note 170, at 1220. But see Lemley, supra note 130, at 1278–79
(expressing concern about relying on the point of novelty when making subject matter
eligibility determinations).
173. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1297–98
(2012).
174. Compare id., with Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
175. Flook, 437 U.S. at 586.
176. Id. at 585 (footnotes omitted).
177. Id. at 594.
178. See id.
179. Compare id., with Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981) (“In determining the
eligibility of [a] claimed process for patent protection under § 101, [the] claims must be
considered as a whole. It is inappropriate to dissect the claims into old and new elements
and then to ignore the presence of the old elements in the analysis.”), and Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
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claim patent eligible.180 That inquiry went far beyond whether the other
limitations simply added something new and non-obvious.181 Thus, there is
no reason to believe that an application based on a newly discovered formula
or natural law is categorically unpatentable under Mayo.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court only explained when certain
limitations failed to add enough to an unpatentable concept. Mayo did not
explain what kind of limitation could be added to an unpatentable concept to
render it patent-eligible. My earlier proposal attempted to fill in that gap and
offer a new point-of-novelty framework (i.e., one different from Flook).
Relying on concepts already found in existing § 101 jurisprudence, I offered a
two-part test for determining when patents cover subject matter that should
be patent eligible.182 Courts should first examine the limitation that embodies
the point of novelty to determine whether it describes an unpatentable
concept (i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea).183 If
it does, the court should then determine whether the other limitations bring
the concept into the realm of patentable subject matter.184 This occurs when
the other limitations are both concrete and strongly connected to the point
of novelty.185
The point of novelty of many software patents is often an abstract idea.
It could be a mathematical formula or a new way of doing business.
Understanding that ideas themselves cannot be claimed, patent attorneys
typically draft software patent claims to include a concrete physical device
like a computer or the Internet.186 They hope that by adding these limitations,
an otherwise unpatentable abstract idea may be rendered patentable. Under
the point-of-novelty approach, this tactic would only work for certain kinds
of patents.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297–98.
See supra Section III.B.
Chao, supra note 15, at 426, 436.
Id. at 436.
Id.
Id.
See Robert A. King, Developing A Successful Intellectual Property Program, in
DEVELOPING A PATENT STRATEGY 117, 2011 WL 1120279 (Aspatore 2011) (“The machine
or transformation test represents a ‘safe harbor’ for claim drafting. Many patent practitioners
draft claims to meet this test, and, in many cases, starting with the minimum amount of
machine-related references in the claims.”); John R. Allison & Starling D. Hunter, On the
Feasibility of Improving Patent Quality One Technology at a Time: The Case of Business Methods, 21
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 729, 736 (2006) (“[A]ttorneys had little difficulty drafting patent
applications on software as though they claimed machines and devices of a more traditional
physical nature.”); David R. Heckadon, Six Months After Bilski: Practical Claim Drafting Tips for
Software and Business Method Patents, GORDON & REES LLP (Nov. 2010),
http://www.gordonrees.com/publications/viewPublication.cfm?contentID=1705.
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The key is to test the strength of the nexus between the point of novelty
and any additional concrete claim limitations. There may be a number of
ways of characterizing such a test. I suggest that when the unpatentable
concept and the additional limitations are bound together and necessary to achieve
the goal of the claimed invention, the nexus is sufficiently strong to be patent
eligible. One way to assess whether the concept is sufficiently bound together
with the other limitations is to determine if the concept stands by itself. For
example, consider Bilski’s idea of hedging risk in a particular industry.187
Computer limitations could be added to the concept, but the concept would
make sense standing by itself and therefore remain ineligible for patenting.
Moreover, just because a computer or other physical device may be useful or
practically necessary does not mean that the claim should be patent eligible.
This means that a patent’s goal cannot be characterized as merely applying a
concept in a manner that is more efficient, faster, or more cost-effective by
simply using a computer to conduct the process.
Although this Article is the first to articulate the “bound together”
standard, the idea of testing the connection between the unpatentable
concept and other limitations is already scattered throughout existing subject
matter patent eligibility jurisprudence. The machine prong of the machine-ortransformation test examines how strong the nexus is between the
unpatentable concept and other more concrete claim limitations (i.e.,
machines). More recently, Bancorp’s requirement that a computer must be
“integral to the claimed invention” tests the same connection.188 The
Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that adding insignificant post-solution
limitations does not make an abstract idea patentable.189 But this is simply
another way of saying that the nexus between the unpatentable concept and
its other limitations is not sufficiently strong.
If these threads existed by themselves, the law would not be so fractured.
It would coalesce around a point-of-novelty approach. Unfortunately, the
courts have also included many other unrelated factors that confuse subjectmatter eligibility determinations. Cases uniformly suggest that claims that
sweep too broadly are less likely to be patent eligible.190 Consequently, they
187. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3222 (2010).
188. See Bancorp Servs. v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(citing SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).
189. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1301 (2012);
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231; Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191–92 (1981); Parker v. Flook,
437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978).
190. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1301; Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231 (“Allowing petitioners to patent
risk hedging would pre-empt use of this approach in all fields, and would effectively grant a
monopoly over an abstract idea.”); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 68 (1972) (stating that
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ask if a limitation has placed a meaningful limit on claim scope191 or
preempted the entire idea.192 The Supreme Court has also pointed to Diehr
and Flook as guideposts, suggesting that a claim is patent eligible if it is closer
to Diehr and is not patent eligible if it is closer to Flook.193 As discussed
earlier, these lines of inquiry suffer from both analytical and practical
problems.194 But just as importantly, these inquiries obscure what should be
the proper inquiry—assessing the strength of the connection between the
unpatentable concept and the other claim limitations. Under the point-ofnovelty approach illustrated in this Article, these other lines of inquiry would
not be used.195
The following examples illustrate how the point-of-novelty approach
works. Consider the patent at issue in Diehr, which claimed a novel algorithm
for curing rubber products.196 Both the formula and the physical components
(the rubber molding press) were necessary to accomplish the invention’s goal
of making precision molded rubber products.197 Without the physical device,
the formula could not achieve the goal of the invention. Moreover, it makes
no sense to discuss the formula apart from the physical devices used to
implement it. Thus, the connection between the idea and the device is
sufficiently strong such that the subject matter should be patent eligible. The
same analysis would also suggest that Flook was wrongly decided.198 The
algorithm for updating the alarm limit of a catalytic chemical conversion of
hydrocarbons was clearly bound together with industrial equipment and both
limitations are necessary to perform the conversion.199 Accordingly, under

the claims before it were “so abstract and sweeping as to cover both known and unknown
uses of the [mathematical formula]”).
191. Dealertrack Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012); CLS Bank I, 685
F.3d 1341, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2012), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 484 F. App’x 559 (Fed.
Cir. 2012), aff’d en banc, 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
192. See, e.g., Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3258 (Breyer, J., concurring); Bancorp, 687 F.3d at 1280–81;
Dealertrack, 674 F.3d at 1331.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 126–30.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 126–36.
195. Chao, supra note 15, at 440.
196. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177 (1981).
197. See id. at 189.
198. See supra text accompanying note 130 (discussing how the challenged patents in
Flook and Diehr appear to be similar).
199. Perhaps the problem was that claim 1 did not explicitly connect the formula to
physical device. But because the claim recited “the catalytic chemical conversion of
hydrocarbons,” Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 596 (1978), the Court could have easily
interpreted the claim to require such limitation or noted that adding such a limitation would
render Flook’s claims patent eligible.
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the point-of-novelty approach, Flook’s invention would have been patent
eligible.
However, in many other cases, the ideas underlying the software patents
do not have strong connections to the devices. Consider the patents in CLS
Bank, where the claims related to a trading system platform for exchanging
obligations.200 The computer limitations were certainly very useful but were
not fundamentally necessary for exchanging obligations.201 Moreover, the
idea of exchanging obligations makes perfect sense standing alone; the nexus
between the physical components and the underlying concept is weak. In
CLS Bank, attaching the concept to a machine should not make the concept
patentable.
The same analysis would apply to the patents in Ultramercial, Cybersource,
and Dealertrack. The ideas underlying all these patents are not sufficiently
bound together with their computer limitations to render them patent
eligible. Ultramercial’s idea of receiving free copyrighted content in exchange
for viewing an advertisement does not clearly need the Internet.202 The idea
makes sense without any physical devices. Cybersource’s fraud detection
patent examined Internet address information and compared it with other
transactions utilizing the same credit card.203 Some type of computer may be
necessary to obtain the Internet address information, but the idea of
comparing addresses did not need to be performed on a computer, much less
any physical device. Thus, this idea is not sufficiently connected to any
concrete limitations. Finally, Dealertrack’s patents merely automated a
method of processing car loans.204 As a practical matter, computers were
undoubtedly necessary to make the system operate efficiently. But that does
not satisfy the revised point-of-novelty test. Since the underlying system
could operate without computers, albeit inefficiently, the patents do not
cover patent-eligible subject matter. Accordingly, none of these patents
would survive the proposed point-of-novelty approach described here.205

200. CLS Bank I, 685 F.3d 1341, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2012), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated,
484 F. App’x 559 (Fed. Cir. 2012), aff’d en banc, 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
201. See id. at 1358 n.1 (Prost, J., dissenting) (using a table to demonstrate how the steps
of one of the claims at issue correspond to ordinary activities).
202. Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 657 F.3d 1323, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
203. CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1367–68 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
204. Dealertrack Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1317–18 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
205. I do not analyze the Bancorp Services patents because, for the most part, the Federal
Circuit took the approach I advocate here. See supra text accompanying notes 154–57.
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As stated earlier, the digital image halftoning patents in Research
Corporation Technologies v. Microsoft pose a more difficult case.206 The claims of
Research Corporation Technologies (“RCT”) revolved around a
mathematical algorithm for determining how to display images for different
devices like printers and displays. By itself the algorithm was clearly
unpatentable.207 But all the claims added some limitations to this algorithm.
At its barest, one method claim merely applied the algorithm to produce “dot
profiles.”208 Other claims also required a computer.209 Still other claims added
physical components like “high contrast film,” “a film printer,” and “printer
and display devices.”210
Under the point-of-novelty approach, the test is whether these limitations
are both concrete and strongly connected to the mathematical algorithm that
lies at the patents’ point of novelty. The last set of claims presents the easiest
case. Clearly, “high contrast film,” “a film printer,” and “printer and display
devices” are concrete. Moreover, the nexus between these devices and the
mathematical algorithm is strong. Using an algorithm to calculate the proper
way to display particular dots is tightly linked with the display devices
themselves. Making those calculations without some form of display device
achieves nothing. Therefore, under the point-of-novelty approach, these
claims would cover patent-eligible subject matter.
The more difficult question arises when these physical components are
not recited by a given claim. This leaves only the dot profiles and the
computer components to consider. Even though the computer limitations
are concrete, they do not have a strong nexus with the underlying
mathematical algorithm. There is no special connection between a computer
and the algorithm for calculating how to display images. Presumably, the
mathematical algorithm can be calculated without the use of a computer. A
computer merely makes the calculations faster. So the computer limitations
do not “add enough” to make the algorithm patent eligible.211
206. Research Corp. Techs. Inc., v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see
also supra text accompanying notes 64–66.
207. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981); see also Gottschalk v. Benson, 409
U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (holding that a mathematical expression is simply a “scientific truth” and
unpatentable (quoting Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939))). But
the claims were not drawn to the algorithm standing alone. Consequently, the Federal Circuit
stated that the claims were not “manifestly abstract” and found that the claims covered
patent eligible subject matter. Research Corp., 627 F.3d at 869.
208. See Research Corp., 627 F.3d at 865 (reciting claim 1 of the ’310 patent).
209. See, e.g., id. at 865–66 (reciting claims 1, 4, and 57 of the ’772 patent).
210. Id. at 869.
211. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1297
(2012) (establishing the “add enough” requirement).
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But what about the dot profiles? Perhaps these limitations can render the
algorithm patent eligible. However, the claimed dot profiles are not physical
dots. The limitations actually refer to data that represents how dots are to be
printed or displayed. This appears to be a close call. But allowing data that
represents concrete objects to satisfy the point of novelty test reopens the
door for business method patents.212 Thus, the “dot profile” limitations
should not be considered sufficiently concrete to transform the unpatentable
algorithm into patent-eligible subject matter.
This result may appear inconsistent with the goals of providing patent
protection to industrial software. But the point is not to give all claims
directed at an industrial software protection. The claims still must be drafted
to include concrete limitations (e.g., printers or displays). That is why some
of RCT’s claims survived the point-of-novelty approach and others did not.
This has the benefit of limiting claim scope—an outcome that both courts
and commentators have sought to make an explicit requirement of § 101
analysis.213 Although the point-of-novelty approach does not have such an
explicit requirement, the RCT example shows how the approach has a claim
narrowing effect.
Some critics may argue that the point-of-novelty test proposed here will
not make it easier to assess patentable subject matter eligibility. There will, of
course, be some close cases, and the “bound together” and “necessary”
language is not a magic bullet that will provide sudden clarity. When applying
this test, the courts need to appreciate the basis for it. First, the test was
designed with the understanding that the Supreme Court wants to do away
with most business method software patents. Second, the test uses and
expands upon the point-of-novelty approach found in Mayo. With this
understanding, the Federal Circuit can achieve greater clarity as it works
through several examples.
In sum, the point-of-novelty approach respects Bilski’s hostility to
business method patents while operating within the analytical framework
required by Mayo. The result will be that most business method software
patents will be declared ineligible because the connection between the
concepts underlying those patents and the computers that they use is not
strong. However, most industrial software patents will remain patent-eligible
because the concepts underlying these inventions are bound together with
specific physical devices.
212. See, e.g., Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber 674 F.3d 1315, 1319–20 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (where
the claims contained limitations directed toward credit card applications).
213. See notes 133–34 and accompanying text; Lemley et al., supra note 44, at 1317
(proposing that the test for patent eligibility under § 101 be based solely on overclaiming).
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In February 2013, after this Article was accepted for publication, the
Federal Circuit heard oral arguments in the en banc hearing of CLS Bank.214
Interestingly, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) took a
similar position to the one advocated here. In response to questions from
Judge Moore, Deputy Solicitor Nathan Kelly argued that a claim does not
become patent-eligible simply because it contains computer limitations.215 He
argued that one must “look deeper into the claim to see if the system and
steps are inseparable.”216 The term “inseparable” is another way of assessing
the strength of the connection between the point of novelty and any
additional concrete claim limitations. Although the USPTO’s brief did not
use the “inseparable” language, it did characterize the same concept in yet
another way. It said that a claim must incorporate “meaningful limitations”
(i.e., a limitation that is not a “mere field-of-use limitation, a tangential
reference to technology, insignificant, extra-solution activity, an ancillary
data-gathering step, or the like.”).217 The patent office’s brief also suggested
six factors for making this determination.218 Although some of these factors
merely parrot back language from precedent, together they act much like the
proposed “bound together and necessary” test. Dennis Crouch has

214. See Oral Argument, CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., No. 2011-1301 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 8,
2013) (en banc), available at http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=20111301_282013.mp3 (for an audio recording of the argument).
215. See id. at 28:00–28:41.
216. See id. at 28:41.
217. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Rehearing En Banc in Support of
Neither Party at 7, CLS Bank III, 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc).
218. The factors are:
[1] whether the computer is recited in a manner that is only nominally or
tangentially related to the performance of the invention . . . ; [2] whether
the computer is generically recited in a manner that would encompass any
machine capable of performing the claimed steps, or whether specific,
unconventional computer equipment, tools, or processing capabilities are
required; [3] whether the invention involves an improvement in the ability
of the computer to function as a computer, or whether the invention
relates principally to an unrelated, non-technological field . . . ; [4] whether
the claim recites a computerized device that manipulates particular data in
particular, specific, and useful ways . . . or whether the computer is recited
solely for its generic functions of automating tasks or communicating over
a distance; [5] whether . . . the abstract idea is bound up in an invention
that effects a transformation of matter, or whether . . . the abstract idea is
merely described in a particular environment; and [6] whether the
computer-related elements of the claim represent conventional steps,
described at a high level of generality, that would have to be employed by
any person who wished to apply the abstract idea.
Id. at 13–14 (citations omitted).
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characterized this as an “odd ball” approach.219 But, as this Article has
argued, this approach sensibly brings together the Supreme Court precedent.
V.

POSTSCRIPT: A DEEPENING SCHISM

The Federal Circuit issued its en banc decision in CLS Bank on May 10,
2013.220 As discussed earlier, the patents concerned exchanging obligations
using a third party to eliminate risk.221 The patents contained three types of
claims directed (1) towards methods of exchanging obligations between
parties, (2) data processing systems, and (3) computer readable media
containing programs for exchanging obligations. The parties stipulated that
all the claims required a computer.222 Although the two-paragraph per curiam
opinion affirmed the district court’s decision finding all the claims patentineligible, the judges were badly divided and the decision failed to give the
guidance that so many followers of the court sought.223 The court was split
five to five on the eligibility of the system claims. While seven judges did find
that the method and computer-readable claims at issue were not patenteligible, those judges could not agree on the rationale for this conclusion. In
fact, no approach was endorsed by a majority of the judges.
The decision contained seven separate opinions reflecting roughly three
analytical approaches. These approaches roughly correspond to opinions
written by Judge Lourie, Chief Judge Rader, and Judge Newman. For
convenience, this Article breaks down the decision into the “strong view”
and the “weak view” of § 101’s patent-eligibility requirement. The strong
view corresponds to Judge Lourie’s opinion (joined by Judges Dyk, Prost,
Reyna, and Wallach). The weak view corresponds to Chief Judge Rader’s first
opinion (joined by Judge Moore and joined in part by Judges Linn and
O’Malley), Judge Moore’s opinion (joined by Chief Judge Rader, Judge Linn,
and Judge O’Malley), Judges Linn and O’Malley’s opinion, and Chief Judge
Rader’s second opinion. Although Judge Newman’s opinion represents a
third distinct analytical approach, the end result would be similar to the weak
view. Accordingly, a brief description of her view is included in Section V.B,
infra, describing the weak view.
219. Dennis Crouch, CLS Bank v. Alice Corp: Oral Arguments Lead to More Questions,
PATENTLY-O (Feb. 9, 2013), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/02/cls-bank-v-alicecorp-oral-arguments-lead-to-more-questions.html.
220. CLS Bank III, 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
221. See supra text accompanying notes 139–41.
222. CLS Bank III, 717 F.3d at 1275 (Lourie, J., concurring).
223. In fact, Chief Judge Rader went so far as to say that “nothing” in the en banc
opinion “beyond our judgment has the weight of precedent.” Id. at 1293 n.1 (Rader, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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THE STRONG VIEW

Judge Lourie’s concurring opinion argued that none of the claims
satisfied § 101 and contains the strongest view of § 101’s subject matter
patent-eligibility requirement. The opinion was joined by Judges Dyk, Prost,
Reyna, and Wallach and thus represents the view of five Federal Circuit
judges. Before describing its approach, the opinion took note of some
“common themes” found in the Supreme Court’s decisions regarding
§ 101.224 “First and foremost is an abiding concern that patents should not be
allowed to preempt the fundamental tools of discovery.”225 In other words,
“claims should not be coextensive with a natural law, natural phenomenon or
abstract idea.”226 Second, Judge Lourie characterized the cases as cautioning
“against overly formalistic approaches to subject-matter eligibility that invite
manipulation by patent applicants.”227 Third, Judge Lourie also said that the
cases “urge a flexible, claim-by-claim approach to subject-matter eligibility
that avoids rigid line drawing.”228
Relying on these principles, Judge Lourie then outlined an approach to
determine whether a computer-implemented claim is patent-eligible.
Assuming that the claim falls within one of the four statutory categories set
out in § 101 (i.e., process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter),
the first question to ask is whether the claim poses any risk of preempting an
abstract idea.229 If it does, a court must then identify the “fundamental
concept” that is wrapped up in the claim.230 The analysis then proceeds to
preemption analysis and looks to whether the claim covers the entire abstract
idea itself.231
The opinion’s preemption analysis relies on examining the “inventive
concept.” According to Judge Lourie, an inventive concept must be added to
the underlying unpatentable fundamental concept to render the claim patenteligible.232 In contrast to a fundamental concept, an inventive concept must
be “a product of human ingenuity.”233 Moreover, the inventive concept
should not be confused with the novelty or obviousness requirements of

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

CLS Bank III, 717 F.3d at 1280–82 (Lourie, J., concurring).
Id. at 1280.
Id. at 1281.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1282.
Id. at 1282–84.
Id. at 1283 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)).
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§§ 102 and 103. Interpreting Parker v. Flook,234 Judge Lourie suggests that
Flook only required that the claim contain an “inventive concept” to be
patent-eligible.
For the most part, Judge Lourie defines an inventive concept in the
negative. It “must represent more than a trivial appendix to the underlying
abstract idea.”235 Thus, limitations that reflect the inventive concept are not
“merely tangential, routine, well-understood, or conventional, or in practice
fail to narrow the claim relative to the fundamental principle.”236 “Bare fieldof-use limitations” do not qualify either.237 Having said what the inventive
concept is not, the discussion of how to approach determining patenteligibility suddenly ends. Instead of explaining the positive characteristics of
the inventive concept, the opinion simply acknowledges that it is not offering
an “easy bright-line test,” but rather one that depends on a “balance of
factors.”238
Judge Lourie’s opinion then proceeds to use this approach to analyze the
claims. Starting with the method claims, the opinion identifies the underlying
abstract idea—“reducing settlement risk by effecting trades through a thirdparty intermediary . . . empowered to verify that both parties can fulfill their
obligations before allowing the exchange—i.e., a form of escrow.”239 Next,

234. Parker v. Flook, 427 U.S. 584 (1978).
235. CLS Bank III, 717 F.3d at 1283 (Lourie, J., concurring).
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1283–84.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 1286. Judge Lourie’s opinion analyzes claim 33 of the ’479 patent as a
representative method claim. It recites:
A method of exchanging obligations as between parties, each party
holding a credit record and a debit record with an exchange institution,
the credit records and debit records for exchange of predetermined
obligations, the method comprising the steps of: (a) creating a shadow
credit record and a shadow debit record for each stakeholder party to be
held independently by a supervisory institution from the exchange
institutions; (b) obtaining from each exchange institution a start-of-day
balance for each shadow credit record and shadow debit record; (c) for
every transaction resulting in an exchange obligation, the supervisory
institution adjusting each respective party’s shadow credit record or
shadow debit record, allowing only these transactions that do not result in
the value of the shadow debit record being less than the value of the
shadow credit record at any time, each said adjustment taking place in
chronological order; and (d) at the end-of-day, the supervisory institution
instructing ones of the exchange institutions to exchange credits or debits
to the credit record and debit record of the respective parties in
accordance with the adjustments of the said permitted transactions, the
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the additional limitations—“creating shadow records, using a computer to
adjust and maintain those shadow records, and reconciling shadow records
and corresponding exchange institution accounts through end-of-day
transactions”—were examined.240 Judge Lourie concludes that they do not
add “anything of substance to the claim.”241
This conclusion is built upon three observations. First, Judge Lourie’s
opinion says that the claim lacks any express language to define the
computer’s participation.242 The computer simply acts as a calculator
performing mental steps faster than a human could. Under the strong view,
that is not sufficient to show the necessary inventive concept.243 Second, the
opinion views the term “shadow record” as “extravagant language” that
merely recites “a basic function required of any financial intermediary in an
escrow arrangement.”244 Finally, Judge Lourie characterizes the step of
providing end-of-day instructions to reconcile the parties’ accounts as a
“trivial limitation.”245 Consequently, Judge Lourie concluded that the method
claim was not drawn to patent-eligible subject matter.
After having found the method claims ineligible, Judge Lourie’s opinion
was quickly able to dispense with the computer-readable medium and system
claims. The opinion characterizes those ostensibly concrete computer
limitations as claim drafting tactics that add nothing of substance.
Specifically, the opinion says that claim 39 of the ’375 patent, the
representative computer-readable medium claim, is not “truly drawn to a
specific computer readable medium, rather than to the underlying
method.”246 Moreover, the system claims merely “recite a handful of
computer components in generic, functional terms that would encompass
any device capable of performing the same ubiquitous calculation, storage,
and connectivity functions required by the method claims.”247 Accordingly,
the opinion concluded that all the asserted claims were invalid under § 101
for failure to recite patent-eligible subject matter.248
credits and debits being irrevocable, time invariant obligations placed on
the exchange institutions.
Id. at 1285.
240. Id. at 1286.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 1287
245. Id.
246. Id. at 1288 (quoting Cybersource Corp. v. Retail Decisions Inc., 654 F.3d 1366,
1374–75 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
247. Id. at 1290.
248. Id. at 1292.
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Although I agree with Judge Lourie’s ultimate conclusion, I have two
critiques of his approach to § 101. First, Judge Lourie overstates the
significance of the “inventive concept” in Supreme Court precedent. Judge
Rader’s first opinion picks up on this flaw and says that Judge Lourie
“imbues” the phrase with “a life that is neither consistent with the Patent
Act’s description of Section 101 nor with the totality of Supreme Court
precedent . . . .”249 I agree. As Chief Judge Rader points out, the Flook
decision that Judge Lourie relies upon only mentions the “inventive concept”
once.250 The Mayo decision does not support Judge Lourie’s reliance on the
inventive concept either.251 Although Flook and Mayo use the phrase to
suggest that a patent must claim something more than a natural law, the
decisions do not gauge patent-eligibility by using the inventive concept.252
Judge Lourie just picks out that phrase to describe when additional
limitations have added “enough” to render an otherwise unpatentable
concept patent-eligible. Thus, his mistake is merely one of nomenclature, not
substance. Nonetheless, relying on the term “inventive concept” provides
room for critics to argue that Judge Lourie’s opinion incorrectly interprets
the controlling precedent.
The second difficulty with Judge Lourie’s approach is more problematic.
The opinion relies on already established principles to say what is not an
inventive concept. Thus, even if this approach were eventually adopted, it
would not provide any practical insights for determining when limitations
actually contain an inventive concept. In contrast, the point-of-novelty
approach proposed in this Article explains when a claim is patent-eligible.
249. Id. at 1303 n.5 (Rader, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
250. Id. Moreover, Judge Lourie’s opinion misinterprets Flook. Flook suggested that a
fundamental concept be treated as if were found in the prior art, and the novelty and nonobviousness requirement had to be satisfied by the other claim limitations. Parker v. Flook
437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978). This interpretation of Flook is shared by many commentators,
including this Author. See supra notes 173–80 and accompanying text; Lemley et al., supra
note 44, at 1335–36.
251. See CLS Bank III, 717 F.3d at 1282 (Lourie, J., concurring) (citing Mayo and Flook to
support the notion of the “inventive concept”).
252. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012).
In Mayo, the Court states:
[Prior decisions] insist that a process that focuses upon the use of a
natural law also contain other elements or a combination of elements,
sometimes referred to as an “inventive concept,” sufficient to ensure that
the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon
the natural law itself.
Id. However, commentators consistently use this phrase. See, e.g., Kevin Emerson Collins,
Prometheus Laboratories, Mental Steps, And Printed Matter, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 391, 402 (2012)
(discussing the use of the phrase, “inventive concept”).
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First, the “bound together” standard tests the nexus between the additional
limitations and the underlying unpatentable concept to determine when
limitations add “enough.” Moreover, by prominently relying on Bilski, the
lower courts can look to business method software patents and industrial
software patents as new guideposts for determining patent-eligibility
questions. To be fair, the point-of-novelty approach described in this Article
is not a bright line test either. But it should provide more clarity than the
approach proposed by Judge Lourie and his allies.
B.

THE WEAK VIEW

Chief Judge Rader authored two separate opinions. His first opinion,
concurring in part and dissenting in part, was joined by Judges Linn (except
part VI), Moore, and O’Malley (except part VI), and reflects a comparatively
weak view of § 101’s subject matter patent-eligibility requirement. The first
five parts of the opinion outline a specific approach for determining patenteligibility and argue that the system claims were patent-eligible under § 101.
Part VI distinguishes the method and computer-readable claims from the
system claims, and argues that the former claims are not patent-eligible.
Judges Linn and O’Malley disagreed with this conclusion and did not join
part VI. Instead they wrote their own opinion explaining why the court
should have found that the method and computer-readable claims were also
patent-eligible.253 Since the distinction between Chief Judge Rader and Judge
Linn’s opinions revolves around different claim interpretations, and not how
to approach subject matter patent-eligibility, Judge Linn’s view does not
represent a distinct approach. Therefore, the weak view discussed here still
represents the view of four Federal Circuit judges.254
Chief Judge Rader’s opinion begins in earnest in Part II and emphasizes
the breadth of subject matter that is patent-eligible under § 101.255 After
providing a lengthy analysis of the legislative history of § 101, the part
concludes by saying: “In sum, any analysis of subject matter eligibility for
patenting must begin by acknowledging that any new and useful process,

253. Thus, of those judges who advocated for a weak interpretation of § 101, only
Judges Rader and Moore still believed that the method and computer-readable claims were
not patent eligible.
254. Judge Linn has recently taken senior status. 2012, UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/2012. Therefore, he
will no longer participate in any future en banc proceedings.
255. See, e.g., CLS Bank III, 717 F.3d at 1294 (Rader, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“Underscoring its breadth, Section 101 both uses expansive categories
and modifies them with the word ‘any.’ ”).
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machine, composition of matter, or manufacture, or an improvement
thereof, is eligible for patent protection.”256
The opinion then goes on to discuss the judicial exceptions to patenteligibility under § 101. Much like the proponents of the stricter view, Chief
Judge Rader notes that a claim cannot merely cover an “abstract idea, law of
nature, or natural phenomenon.” Of course Chief Judge Rader’s opinion
strikes an entirely different tone than Judge Lourie’s opinion, calling the
exceptions “limited”257 and pointing out that “[a]ny claim can be stripped
down, simplified, generalized, or paraphrased to remove all of its concrete
limitations, until at its core, something that could be characterized as an
abstract idea is revealed.”258
Under Chief Judge Rader’s approach, the primary inquiry “is whether a
claim includes meaningful limitations restricting it to an application, rather than
merely an abstract idea.”259 The opinion discusses different ways for
determining whether a limitation is sufficiently meaningful. First, “a claim is
not meaningfully limited if it merely describes an abstract idea or simply adds
‘apply it.’ ”260 Second, a claim “will not be limited meaningfully if it contains
only insignificant or token pre- or post-solution activity—such as identifying
a relevant audience, a category of use, field of use, or technological
environment.”261 Finally, “a claim is not meaningfully limited if its purported
limitations provide no real direction, cover all possible ways to achieve the
provided result, or are overly-generalized.”262 These three concepts are found
in Supreme Court precedent and are also discussed by Judge Lourie.263
Consequently, they fail to illustrate how the proponents of the weak view of
§ 101 differ from the proponents of the strong view. It is only when the
opinion analyzes the system claims does Chief Judge Rader reveal how he
would approach patent-eligibility questions for software patents.

256. Id. at 1297 (emphasis added).
257. Id.
258. Id. at 1298.
259. Id. at 1299.
260. Id. at 1300 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct.
1289, 1294, 1297 (2012)).
261. Id. at 1300–01 (citing Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297–98; Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct.
3218, 3230–31 (2010); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191–92 & n.14 (1981)); Parker v.
Flook 437 U.S. 584, 595 n.18 (1978).
262. CLS Bank III, 717 F.3d at 1301 (Rader, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1300).
263. See discussion supra Section V.A.
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Chief Judge Rader’s opinion starts with the system claims, which have
the most concrete computer based limitations.264 The main thrust of Chief
Judge Rader’s opinion is that each system claim “does not claim anything
abstract in its machine embodiments.”265 In support of that conclusion, the
opinion points out that the representative claim includes “at least four
separate structural components: a computer, a first party device, a data storage
unit, and a communication controller coupled via machine components to the
computer and the first party device.”266 Relying on the specification, the
opinion goes on to argue that the structural and functional limitations found
in the claims should not be considered post-solution activity but integral to
the performance of the claimed system.267 For example, the specification
describes how different computer components operate.268 It also contains
flowcharts that describe specific algorithms that support the recited
functions.269 Finally, the opinion also examines the claims from a more
intuitive level. Because the claims contain concrete computer based
264. In contrast, Judge Lourie’s opinion begins with the method claims, which appear to
recite the least concrete limitations. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
265. CLS Bank III, 717 F.3d at 1306 (Rader, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
266. Id. at 1307. Chief Judge Rader’s first opinion analyzed claim 26 of the ’375 patent as
a representative system claim. The claim recites:
A data processing system to enable the exchange of an obligation between
parties, the system comprising: a communications controller, a first party
device, coupled to said communications controller, a data storage unit
having stored therein (a) information about a first account for a first party,
independent from a second account maintained by a first exchange
institution, and (b) information about a third account for a second party,
independent from a fourth account maintained by a second exchange
institution; and a computer, coupled to said data storage unit and said
communications controller, that is configured to (a) receive a transaction
from said first party device via said communications controller;
(b) electronically adjust said first account and said third account in order
to effect an exchange obligation arising from said transaction between
said first party and said second party after ensuring that said first party
and/or said second party have adequate value in said first account and/or
said third account, respectively; and (c) generate an instruction to said first
exchange institution and/or said second exchange institution to adjust
said second account and/or said fourth account in accordance with the
adjustment of said first account and/or said third account, wherein said
instruction being an irrevocable, time invariant obligation placed on said
first exchange institution and/or said second exchange institution.
Id. at 1306.
267. Id. at 1306–07.
268. Id.
269. Id.
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limitations, Chief Judge Rader suggests that labeling the system claim an
abstract concept “wrenches all meaning from those words, and turns a
narrow exception into one which may swallow the expansive rule (and with it
much of the investment and innovation in software).”270
At this point, Chief Judge Rader’s opinion goes on to discuss the method
without the concurrence of Judges Linn and O’Malley. In contrast to the
system claims, Chief Judge Rader’s opinion found that the method claims
were not drawn to patent-eligible subject matter.271 The opinion examined
each limitation of the representative claim272 and found that they were all
inherent to the fundamental concept of an escrow. The fact that the parties
had stipulated that the method claims required a computer was insufficient to
save them.273 Chief Judge Rader said that “implicit reference to computer
‘implementation’ is not, by itself, enough.”274 In sum, Chief Judge Rader
concluded that the claim as a whole simply encompassed an abstract
concept—namely, the entire concept of “using an escrow to avoid the risk of
one party’s inability to pay.”275
In essence, Chief Judge Rader and his allies view the vast majority of
claims that contain computer limitations as being patent-eligible. The
concept of ignoring computer-based limitations because they are not integral
to the underlying idea only applies for patents that lie on one end of the
spectrum. Under this view, a claim that does no more than simply add a
computer to an otherwise unpatentable idea remains unpatentable. But
claims that describe how an idea is implemented on particular components
should be patent-eligible, even if that description is extremely basic. Of

270. Id. at 1309; see also id. at 1319 (Moore, J., dissenting in part) (“Looking at these
hardware and software elements, it is impossible to conclude that this claim is merely an
abstract idea.”).
271. Oddly, Chief Judge Rader’s opinion does not explicitly analyze the computerreadable medium claims. However, he concludes in the same sentence that the “method and
media claims” are not patent-eligible. Id. at 1313 (Rader, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Presumably, Chief Judge Rader is applying the same analysis to both
types of claims.
272. See supra note 239 for the text of this claim, claim 33 of the ’479 patent.
273. This is where Judges Linn and O’Malley disagree. Their opinion interprets the
method claims more narrowly and argues that they require “more than the use of computer
is some unspecified way.” CLS Bank III, 717 F.3d at 1329–30 (Linn & O’Malley, JJ.,
dissenting). Accordingly, Judges Linn and O’Malley would treat the method claims just as
Chief Judge Rader treats the system claims. See id. at 1330.
274. Id. at 1312 (Rader, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
275. Id.
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course almost any patent attorney should be able to draft claims that meet
this requirement.276
Although the proponents of the weak view ostensibly apply Supreme
Court precedent, it is hard to reconcile their analysis with Bilski and Mayo.
First, just one year earlier, Mayo had rejected a similar invitation to find “that
virtually any step beyond a statement of a law of nature itself should
transform an unpatentable law of nature into a potentially patentable
application sufficient to satisfy § 101’s demands.”277 Second, the “intuitive”
understanding of what an abstract idea is that both Judges Rader and Moore
apply is clearly inconsistent with Mayo. Indeed, a second separate opinion,
Chief Judge Rader complains that “equating the personalized medicinal effect
of a human-created pharmaceutical in patients of different metabolic rates
and genetic makeup with the speed of light is only possible in a netherworld
of undefined judicial insights.”278 Clearly, the Supreme Court has a broader
view of what an abstract idea is than Chief Judge Rader and his allies. Finally,
the proponents of the weak view do not acknowledge the hostility to
business method patents found in Bilski.279
It is hardly surprising that the proponents of the weak view seem at odds
with what the Supreme Court has said. The judges who signed on to the
opinion appear to be quite dissatisfied with the Supreme Court’s recent
patent-eligibility jurisprudence. Judge Moore (joined by Chief Judge Rader
and Judges Linn and O’Malley) writes that she is “concerned that the current
interpretation of § 101, and in particular the abstract idea exception, is
causing a free fall in the patent system.”280 Moreover, Chief Judge Rader’s
second opinion cites to Bilski and Mayo (as well as several Federal Circuit
decisions) as evidence of the failure of § 101 jurisprudence.281 In short, while
the proponents of the weak view give an obligatory salute to the governing
Supreme Court precedent, they suggest a very different approach. If
anything, the opinions written by Judges Rader, Moore, and Linn/O’Malley
appear to be more of a plea to the Supreme Court to lower the bar for patent
eligibility and return it to the standard of the pre-Bilski and Mayo era.
Again, this Article does not explore the possibility of fundamental change
to patent-eligibility requirements under § 101. Others may do so. Perhaps the
276. See supra note 186.
277. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303 (2012).
278. CLS Bank III, 717 F.3d at 1335 (Rader, C.J., additional reflections). The opinion
does not explicitly mention Mayo, but is clearly referring to that decision.
279. See supra notes 85–91 and accompanying text.
280. CLS Bank III, 717 F.3d at 1313 (Moore, J., dissenting in part).
281. Id. at 1333–36 (Rader, C.J., additional reflections).
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Supreme Court should throw in the towel and rethink how it approaches
basic questions of patent eligibility.282 One such option is simply lowering the
eligibility requirement along the lines suggested by Chief Judge Rader’s
opinion. But that view is not based on recent precedent. What is more, there
are no signs that the Supreme Court will make such a radical shift.283 In the
meantime, the point-of-novelty approach suggested by this Article deals with
the here and now. By working within the confines of recent Supreme Court
decisions, it sets forth a practical framework for determining patent-eligibility
questions raised by software patents.
Finally, Judge Newman’s opinion merits some attention. Judge
Newman’s opinion represents her views alone. Although she would have
found the all the claims were patent-eligible, her approach differs from the
proponents of the weak view. Like Judge Rader, Judge Newman views the
attempts to interpret patent-eligibility under § 101 as a failure.284 But her
solution is quite a bit simpler than the proponents of the weak view. Judge
Newman argues that so long as a patent falls within the “useful arts” listed in
§ 101, the courts should only apply the “laws of novelty, utility, prior art,
obviousness, description, enablement, and specificity.”285 Again, this is clearly
not the current state of the law. Moreover, because the Supreme Court just
rejected this very argument in Mayo, Judge Newman’s approach is unlikely to
provide the realistic solution that this Article seeks.286
VI.

CONCLUSION

After the fractured decision in CLS Bank, the law is still in a state of flux
and no one can say with certainty just what kind of software patents, if any,
satisfy § 101’s patent-eligibility requirement. This Article attempts to identify
a realistic path out of the current morass by describing a test for determining
when software patents cover patent-eligible subject matter. Relying on bits
and pieces from existing precedent, the proposed point-of-novelty approach
reins in harmful business method software patents without affecting their
more deserving industrial cousins. Moreover, the theory does so without

282. See Lemley et al., supra note 44.
283. See supra text accompanying note 277.
284. CLS Bank III, 717 F.3d at 1321 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“[A]n all-purpose bright-line rule for threshold portal of section 101 is unavailable as it
is unnecessary.”).
285. Id. at 1322.
286. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303 (2012)
(rejecting the government’s argument that §§ 102, 103, and 112 can perform the proper
screening function for patents).

1260

BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 28:1217

categorically declaring all business method patents ineligible, a step that the
Supreme Court refused to take in Bilski.
In addition to answering an important doctrinal question, this Article also
operates on a more theoretical level. It builds on earlier point-of-novelty
works287 and applies that thinking to one of the most vexing questions facing
patent law today—patent eligibility determinations for software patents. This
demonstrates that the proposed patent eligibility test is also rooted in a firm
theoretical foundation. Moreover, by providing another example of a pointof-novelty solution, this Article hopes to reinforce the case for relying on
point-of-novelty thinking more generally in patent law.

287. See generally Chao, supra note 15; Lemley, supra note 130; Chao, supra note 170.

